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This study examines the relationship between politician’s equity holdings and the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of companies. Politician equity holdings 
reflect not only the self-interested investment activity of firms, but also a potential source of 
benefit to the firm as politicians naturally pursue their self-interest through pro-firm legislative 
and regulatory activity. These investments come at the cost, however, of increased public 
scrutiny and political monitoring over the firm’s activities. Using politician equity holding data 
and CSR data for a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find evidence that firms respond to politician 
equity holdings through both increased CSR strengths and concerns, suggesting that both social 
pressure and politician interventions are motivating firm CSR behavior. These findings are 
robust to the use of alternative models which account for potential endogeneity concerns.  
 
 
Keywords: Politician Equity Holdings: Corporate Social Responsibility. 





 This study examines the impact of politician’s equity holdings on the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) performance of companies with politician shareholders.1 Politicians, as 
investors, are notable in that they have an unusually high level of power and influence over firms 
and their regulatory environment. Politician investments have previously been examined for their 
signaling effect to firms, where politician investments signal their predisposition to take positive 
actions on behalf of the firm. Given their economic incentives, politician equity holders may also 
use their political power to take pro-firm actions out of purely economic interests. Politician 
investments in firm equities, therefore, may lead firms to shirk on their CSR activities in order to 
boost accounting performance, avoiding costly compliance with regulation or costly investments 
in socially responsible activities. Political influence, however, comes at the cost of additional 
public scrutiny from public stakeholder groups. As per the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 
politicians are required to regularly disclose their personal investment portfolio to both the 
general public and to government oversight committees and regulators. “Good government” and 
anti-corruption groups regularly undertake campaigns to scrutinize politician investments for 
perceived conflicts of interest (Ayling & Gunningham 2017). Rather than freeing up firms to 
shirk on their CSR investments, companies may attract additional scrutiny due to their 
association with the politician.2 Whether one effect or the other dominates in this setting is an 
open empirical question.  
                                                
1 Following prior research by McWilliams and Siegel (2001) and others, we define CSR as activities undertaken by 
firms intended to promote social causes (e.g. environmental protection, sustainability, and philanthropy among 
others) rather than merely comply with minimum standards of corporate behavior. We identify and define the 
specific areas of CSR examined in this paper beginning in Section III. See Aguinis & Glavas (2012) for a review of 
CSR literature.  
2 Note that this association does not need to be a formal connection beyond the investment position in order to 
attract increased public scrutiny. The mere fact that a politician has invested in a firm may be enough to lead 
activists to scrutinize the firm in an effort to find potential conflicts of interest.  
 3 
 A recent example of politician equity holders acting advancing the interest of firms in 
which they hold equity involves the former Republican member of the House of Representative 
and Secretary of Health and Human Services Tom Price. During the negotiations for the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, then-Representative Price travelled to Australia to lobby on behalf of the 
U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Mr. Price was particularly concerned with extending protections 
for clinical trial data from the proposed 5 years to the industry-preferred 12 years (Faturechi 
2017b). This lobbying was not merely an attempt to help random U.S. companies, however. Just 
prior to his trip to Australia, Mr. Price had purchased over $90,000 worth of pharmaceutical 
stocks (Faturechi 2017b). This incident came on the heels of several prior incidents, reportedly 
being investigated by U.S. Attorney for Manhattan Preet Bharara at the time of Bharara’s 
dismissal, in which Mr. Price bought and sold hundreds of thousands of dollars in health-related 
equities while sponsoring legislation designed to delay regulatory enforcement and expedite drug 
approvals for those same firms (Faturechi 2017a). In this way, Mr. Price was able to use his 
power and legislative influence to maximize the value of his personal investments. Another 
example of this type of financial regulatory capture can be seen in the “Halliburton Loophole” 
which prevents the Environmental Protection Agency from regulating fracking, a natural gas 
extraction technique pioneered by Halliburton (New York Times 2009). That regulatory barrier 
was placed during the administration of President George W. Bush at the behest of Vice 
President Dick Cheney, former CEO of Halliburton. Between 2004 and 2005, the value of 
Cheney’s Halliburton stock options grew from approximately $240,000 to more than $8 million 
in 2005 (Byrne 2005). This growth in Halliburton’s market valuation is attributed, in large part, 
to direct payments of billions of dollars in military contracts they were awarded during the Bush 
administration as well as to regulatory changes such as the “Halliburton Loophole.” 
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  We examine our research question using Riskmetrics KLD data on CSR performance 
and politician equity holding data from U.S. government Personal Finance Disclosure (PFD) 
files for a sample of S&P 1500 firms for the period between 2004 and 2013. Our CSR data 
provides information regarding CSR strengths and concerns across a range of issue areas for 
each firm. This information allows us to differentiate between two specific ways in which 
politician shareholders may influence CSR behavior: reducing concerns (i.e. limiting socially 
irresponsible activity) and increasing strengths (i.e. increasing socially responsible activity). Our 
results provide two key insights. Our first key insight, provided by our primary results, is that 
firms with one or more politician shareholders display both greater numbers of CSR strengths 
and an overall improvement in CSR performance. We then extend these primary results in 
several ways. First, we account for endogeneity concerns regarding the heterogenous 
composition of our politician-owned and non-politician owned samples using coarsened exact 
matching. We also explore potential biases arising from reverse causality and correlated omitted 
variable using first-differenced regressions. Additionally, we control for potential selection bias 
using a Heckman selection model and various proxies for differential influence levels among our 
sample of politicians. Finally, we examine investment behavior around changes in CSR behavior 
to and from the worst performing group of companies. These supplemental tests lead us to our 
second key insight that firms with larger numbers of politician shareholders and larger (i.e. 
higher value) equity holdings are associated with both increased CSR strengths and concerns. By 
contrast, we find no significant CSR impact of the proportion of firm shares held by politicians. 
This suggests that the mechanism through which our observed effect occurs falls outside the 
realm of formal monitoring or control. Our main results also mask what appears to be an 
asymmetric effect of politician ownership on CSR concerns, with more influential politicians 
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being associated with increased CSR concerns while less influential politicians are associated 
with decreased CSR concerns.   
 Our study makes three main contributions to the academic literature. First, we contribute 
to the literature on corporate social responsibility by providing further insight into how political 
considerations influence CSR activity.3 Consistent with the view that firms may be 
simultaneously socially responsible and irresponsible, we find that political equity holders 
prompt adjustments to both CSR strengths and concerns depending on what type of politician has 
invested in the firm.  From both a methodological and conceptual standpoint, our results support 
the emerging view that researchers must separately consider CSR strengths and concerns rather 
than merely compounding strengths and concerns into a single measure of CSR performance 
(Strike et al. 2006). Our use of exploratory factor analysis to develop CSR factor scores also 
recommends a methodological contribution to the CSR literature. Second, our research adds to 
the literature on political connections by identifying a weak form of political connections which 
do not involve formal or long-term commitments. Recent studies on politician equity holdings by 
Tahoun (2014), Tahoun & Van Lent (2016), Baloria (2015), and Huang & Xian (2017) suggest 
that such holdings are an underappreciated source of economic benefits for firms. Third, we 
contribute to the management accounting literature on decision-making by improving our 
understanding of how the political environment influences firm decisions.   
 This rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a review of the relevant 
literature and develops hypotheses related to our research question. Section 3 provides an 
                                                
3 Our results must be contrasted with those from Lin, Tan, Zhao, and Karim (2015), who find that firms increase 
their charitable donations when a regime change necessitates the nurturing of new political connections in order to 
maintain the status quo. Their study examines direct political connections (essentially a form of patronage 
relationship) in the Chinese context; a context where individual local politicians have relatively enormous power 
relative to politicians in our sample. By contrast, our study examines both socially responsible (strengths) and 
irresponsible (concerns) in a context where the political connection is relatively weak.  
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overview of our sample and research methodology. Our results are discussed in Section 4 and are 
followed by our concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Politicians’ Equity Holdings on Firm Operating Environment 
Prior research has focused on the conflicting economic and social motives of politicians 
with respect to their investments. Once politicians acquire shares of a firm, they have the same 
economic incentives as any other investor to maximize the benefit they receive from their 
investment. Unlike other investors, politicians have traditionally been both privy to value-
relevant information as a result of their status as politicians and less constrained in their ability to 
utilize their private information for material benefit. For example, U.S politicians have not 
traditionally been subject to insider trading prohibitions, allowing politicians to use their 
knowledge and connections to develop personal wealth through targeted investments 
(Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd, & Ziobrowski 2004; Huang & Xuan 2017).4 Additionally, politicians 
have a much greater ability to influence a firm’s regulatory environment compared to other 
investors. Tahoun (2014) finds that politicians are likely to take explicit actions that benefit firms 
in which they hold equity ownership stakes. U.S. politicians, as individuals as well as within 
their caucus, have significant power to influence legislation and direct government resources to 
favored firms and industries (Goldman, Rocholl, & So 2013; Cohen & Malloy 2014). Tahoun 
(2014) also suggests that even relatively small politician equity positions could provide 
meaningful benefits to firms due to the potentially outsized influence a single politician can have 
                                                
4 Congress passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act in 2012 to close this loophole in 
trading regulations. Huang & Xuan (2017) find that this legislation has been effective in curbing the ability of 
politicians to benefit from informational advantages.  
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on the legislative and regulatory process. Therefore, the emerged politicians’ equity holdings 
would influence firm behavior due to their significance (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Demsetz & 
Villalonga 2001).  
Regulatory Capture Theory and Economic Incentives of Politicians  
The mechanism through which politicians may influence firm operating environments is 
through regulatory capture. The concept of regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971; Laffont and Tirole, 
1991; Kwak 2014) suggests that companies have a vested interest in exerting influence over the 
regulatory process. Regulatory capture can take two forms: financial and cultural capture (Kwak 
2014). These different forms of regulatory capture differ in the motivations which underlie them, 
with financial capture being motivated primarily by the economic self-interest of politicians and 
regulators while cultural capture is motivated by philosophical agreement between regulated 
firms and their regulators. Yadlin (2015) finds that large firms are more likely to rely on 
financial, rather than cultural, capture as a means of improving the regulatory environment in 
which they operate.  
Studies have examined political connected directors, lobbying expenditures, and political 
contributions as potential indicators for the presence of financial capture (Faccio 2006; Faccio 
2010; Duchin & Sosyura 2012; Goldman, Rocholl & So 2013). Prior research has, however, 
largely ignore the potential for financial capture to occur in the context of politician investments. 
Instead, prior literature has focused on the idea of quid-pro-quo financial capture where 
regulators and legislators undertake specific pro-firm actions with the promise of future 
employment as directors or advisors, among other implied rewards (Faccio 2010; Duchin & 
Sosyura 2012). As previously discussed in this paper, recent incidents involving prominent 
 8 
members of the U.S. Congress and Executive Branch provide ample evidence of investment-
motivated behavior which could be classified as financial regulatory capture.  
Public Monitoring and the Political Incentives of Politician Equity Holdings 
In contrast to predictions of regulatory capture, prior research has established the social 
and political pressures faced by politicians due to their desire to be re-elected (Mayhew, 1974; 
Fenno, 1978). Watts (2003) suggests that voter scrutiny pushes politicians to engage in more 
social activities within the electoral district. While prior research finds that politicians exert 
greater effort on initiatives that benefit the local constituency (including local businesses) 
(Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; Faccio and Parsley 2009; Duchin and Sosyura 2012; Eggers and 
Hainmueller 2014), the need to be seen as a positive force extends beyond to district to all of 
their activity.  This evidence suggests that politicians would have stronger incentives to aid local 
firms for their reelection by the tight connection. 
Given the high profile and public investment disclosures of politician equity holders, it is 
not surprising that the increased scrutiny applied to politicians extends to the companies in which 
they hold equity. Representative Phil Gramm, for example, held shares in Enron as a result of his 
wife serving on their Board of Directors. His reputation for promoting Enron’s interest around 
Washington was well known, as was the support of other top Republicans (Dunbar, Moore, & 
Sylwester 2002). Voters can force politicians to take actions which worsen the regulatory 
environment for firms through the use of public pressure and influence campaigns (Baloria 
2015). For example, child labor issues within global supply chains, such as those faced by Nike 
in the 1990s and, more recently, Apple in Chinese factories, represent a specific example where 
voters' outcry led manufacturing businesses to accept additional regulation and oversight 
designed to ensure compliance with home country expectations of socially responsible behavior 
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(Minor & Morgan 2011; Scherer & Palazzo 2011). Climate change and sustainability activists 
increasingly view fossil fuel companies as being complicit in what they say is the insufficient 
government response to climate change (Arling & Gunningham 2017). Since voters value greater 
employment (Schleifer and Vishny 1994), they will be angered by job cuts and lost pensions 
resulting from firm dissolution.  
Voters in public can identify connection between politicians and firms in a number of 
ways, including the media (Guay 2010), reports issued by financial analysts (Knight 2007), or 
watchdog groups (i.e. Center for Political Accountability). The requirement that politicians 
publicly disclose their individual equity holdings means that they face constant scrutiny with 
respect to their political connections with firms and, by extension, for the behavior of those 
firms. Enhancing CSR strengths could be a strategic choice which reflects the increased scrutiny 
which stems from politician ownership. Political considerations are important drivers of CSR 
activity within firms (Garriga & Miele 2004; Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee 2014).  
Rooted in electoral competition theory, voters’ pressure extends not only to firm 
management, but also to its shareholders. For politicians holding equity positions in individual 
firms, such pressure can be significantly more concentrated given that every voter in their 
constituency is an important stakeholder for CSR.  Political incentives of political equity 
holdings is a prevalent driver of CSR behavior in firms.  
Hypothesis Development 
 To the extent that politicians may use their own political to extract maximum wealth 
gains from their investments, we expect increased CSR concerns within firms with politician 
equity holders. Evidence exists that politicians use their influence to weaken regulatory 
monitoring for firms with which they are affiliated (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven 2008; Chaney, 
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Faccio, & Parsley 2011; Yu & Yu 2011; Correia 2014; Fisman & Wang 2015)  While politicians 
are not necessarily affiliated or connected to firms in which they own equity, they are 
nonetheless likely to exert similar influence over the regulatory environment out of rational self-
interest. As such, firms may engage in socially irresponsible, but economically profitable, 
behavior with the expectation that politician self-interest will guide politicians to protect them 
from increased compliance costs. We hypothesize, therefore, that firms with politician 
shareholders are less likely to engage in socially responsible behaviors by virtue of the protection 
from regulatory monitoring and negative consequences provided by their political connections.  
Hypothesis H1a: Firms with politician shareholders exhibit weaker CSR performance 
compared to firms without politician shareholders. 
 
Given the increased likelihood of public scrutiny by voters and media which accompanies 
politician equity holdings, however, we also hypothesize that firms will engage in more socially 
responsible behavior in order to meet the demands of social monitors. This allows the 
economically beneficial interventions of politicians to continue, as sufficiently high levels of 
negative attention would likely force politicians to abandon their investment and, by extension, 
increase compliance costs for the firm. We therefore hypothesize that firms with politician 
shareholders are more likely to engage in socially responsible behaviors as a response to 
reelection and to stave off social punishment (i.e. boycotts and protests). 
Hypothesis H1b: Firms with politician shareholders exhibit stronger CSR performance 
compared to firms without politician shareholders. 
 
 
III. Research Methodology 
Sample and Data Description 
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We test out hypotheses using a sample of S&P 1500 firms for the period between 2004 
and 2013. We utilize data from four distinct sources in constructing our sample. First, we gather 
data regarding the individual equity holding of U.S. politicians from mandated financial 
disclosures known as Personal Financial Disclosure (PFD) filings. Data on CSR performance is 
extracted from the RiskMetrics KLD Statistical Tool for Analyzing Trends in Social and 
Environmental Performance (KLD STATS or KLD). Financial statement and stock return data 
for each firm-year observation is taken from the merged Compustat/CRSP database.  
Our primary independent variable of interest is the level of politician equity holdings in a 
firm. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 mandates that politicians and key public officials5 
file annual reports detailing their financial position, including disclosures of individual equity 
holdings. These filings information related to family income, personal and business assets and 
liabilities, and significant financial transactions undertaken during the calendar year. We utilize 
disclosures of individual equity holdings contained in these PFD reports to match politician 
equity holdings with financial statement and CSR data.6 We obtain digitized PFD report data 
from the Center for Responsive Politics.7 The original data include 103,276 records of equity 
holdings for 876 unique individuals between 2004 through 2013. On average, an individual 
politician reports 25.39 different securities in a year (σ = 74.58) in their equity investment 
portfolios.  
From the original dataset, 9,525 company/security names are identified. However, 
significant variation in the disclosed names, along with typographic errors, exists due to the large 
                                                
5 They include members of Congress, candidates for federal office, senior Congressional staff, nominees for 
executive branch positions, Cabinet members, the President and Vice President, and Supreme Court justices. In our 
main tests, politicians refer to these individuals. Subsample analyses  
6 Our analysis includes equity share holdings reported politicians and their immediate family (i.e. spouses and 
dependent children).  
7 A registered user can download this publicly-available data at https://www.opensecrets.org/myos/bulk.php. 
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number of people involved in compiling and preparing these reports.8 These data quality issues 
create significant difficulty in preparing an accurate database of politician equity holdings. We 
address this issue by reviewing the entire list of company names disclosed in the PFD database 
and locating their standardized and/or legal names, stock market ticker symbols, and CUSIP 
numbers for use in matching firms to company identifiers contained in the Compustat/CRSP 
database (i.e. gvkey). We next utilized a statistical matching procedure to match as many firms 
as possible through automated means. Remain non-matches were hand screened and manually 
matched by the study authors. The final dataset contains 8,402 unique names of which 4,465 are 
matched to gvkeys.  
The key dependent variable used in this study is CSR performance. As a reliable archival 
source of CSR performance data, prior literature has made extensive use of KLD STATS to 
examine CSR performance across a broad cross-sectional sample of firms (e.g. Dhaliwal et al. 
2011). The KLD database provides CSR performance for approximately 3,000 of the largest (as 
measured by market capitalization) U.S. companies with respect to the CSR strengths and 
concerns in seven qualitative issue areas: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, and products.9 The database evaluates annual CSR 
performance along multiple dimensions of performance for each qualitative issue area using 
binary indicators (i.e. 1 or 0). For example, Environment includes eight indicators for strengths 
in the area and six for concerns.10  Mishra and Modi (2013) argue that the importance of 
                                                
8 For example, we find “Abbot Laboratories,” “Abbot Labs,” “Abbott,” and even “Abbott Laboratorites” 
(apparently, a typo), are used to indicate Abbott Laboratories. “Hallibruton Co” (a typo), “Halliburton Co,” and 
“Halliburton Co Holdings Co” are found for Halliburton Co. Castle (A M) & Co is compiled with “AM Castle & 
Co,” “Castle AM & Co,” and “Castle AM & Com Stock.” 
9 The data coverage has expanded from 650 firms in 1991 to 3,100 firms in 2003. 
10 Strengths include indicators for (1) Beneficial Products and Services, (2) Pollution Prevention, (3) Recycling, (4) 
Clean Energy, (5) Communications, (6) Property, Plant, and Equipment, (7) Management Systems, and (8) Others 
Strengths, while concerns include those for (1) Hazardous Waste, (2) Regulatory Problems, (3) Ozone Depleting 
Chemicals Substantial Emissions, (4) Agricultural Chemicals, (5) Climate Change, and (6) Other Concerns. See the 
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distinguishing between CSR strengths and CSR concerns due to differences in their construction. 
Unlike CSR strengths, CSR concerns capture a firm’s irresponsible social actions which reflect 
opportunistic behavior and weaken firm reputation (Strike, Gao, and Bansal. 2006). 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
After combining politician equity holding and CSR data with financial statement and 
stock market data from the merged Compustat/CRSP database, we arrive at a panel sample 
comprising 1,913 uniquely identified non-financial firms and 7,406 firm-years. Table 1, Panel A 
reports descriptive statistics for our full sample. The mean numbers of CSR strengths and 
concerns reported by sample firms are 2.489 and 2.358 respectively. When netted against each 
other to form an aggregate measure of overall CSR performance (i.e. #Total = #Strengths - 
#Concerns), strengths and concerns largely offset each other and result in a mean total CSR 
performance of 0.131. We find a similar pattern of CSR strengths slightly outpacing CSR 
concerns to yield overall positive total CSR performance when we use factor analysis on each 
KLD issue area to generate CSR factor scores for strengths (Strengths-Factor), concerns 
(Concerns-Factor), and the difference between the two (Total-Factor). We identify 4,106 
(55.4%) of our firm-year observations which include one or more politician shareholders. These 
firms are labeled as politician owned firms, or POFs. On average, there are approximately five 
politician shareholders in a firm-year. The average size of their investment in a firm-year 
amounts to $452,208 (approximately $90,000 per politician shareholder). The ownership 
proportion (0.003%) is relatively low, suggesting that politician equity holdings are unlikely to 
impact firm decision-making through formal corporate governance mechanisms.  
                                                
appendix for more details regarding the qualitative issue areas. 
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Table 1, Panel B compares POFs with non-POFs and presents simple difference tests of 
the mean and median values for our main variables of interest and control variables. This panel 
shows that both the numbers of both strengths and concerns are substantially larger in POFs as 
compared to non-POFs. Total CSR performance (#Total) is positive for POFs but negative for 
non-POFs. Factor scores yield a similar pattern of differences in CSR performance between 
POFs and non-POFs. POFs have an average (median) of nine (three) politician shareholders. 
Politician investments in POFs average $815,649 (median = $56,500), accounting for an average 
(median) of 0.006% (0.004%) of total market value of equity. When it comes to other firm 
characteristics, POFs are in general larger, older, more complex, more financially stable, and 
faster growing than non-POFs 
< Insert Table 1 About Here > 
Table 2 presents correlations among our variables of interest and control variables. These 
results identify a generally positive correlation between politician equity holdings (DPoliticians 
Holding, #Politicians Holding Shares, $Politician-Held Shares) and CSR strengths, concerns, and 
total CSR performance. A similar relationship is not observed, however, for the proportion of 
total equity held by politicians (%Politician-Held Shares/MVE).  
< Insert Table 2 About Here > 
Empirical Model 
 We test the hypotheses using the firm-year panel dataset. Our main research 
model regresses CSR performance on politicians share ownership using the following equation: 
                      CSRt = β0 + β1Politicians’ Holdingt-1 + ∑βiControlst + ε. (1) 
In this model, CSRt refers to a set of proxies for CSR performance measured in year t at the firm-
year level. These proxies include (1) a count of CSR strength indicators for all issue areas 
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(denoted as Strengths), (5) a count of CSR concern indicators for all issue areas (denoted as 
Concerns), and (6) a compound measure calculated as the count of CSR strengths minus the 
count of CSR concerns for all issue areas following Mishra & Modi (2013) (denoted as Total). 
Politicians’ Holdingt-1 captures the effect of politicians’ equity holding on CSR performance. 
Our primary research variable, DPolitician Holding, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s 
shares are owned by one or more politicians or government officials, and 0 otherwise.  
While our main tests provide insight into the primary effect of politician equity holdings, 
there is substantial heterogeneity among politicians in terms of their equity positions. We provide 
further insight into this heterogeneity by extending our primary analysis and adopting three 
alternative proxies for the intensity of politician’s incentives to engage in pro-firm behavior: (1) 
the number of politicians holding a firm’s shares (#Politicians Holding Shares), (2) the market 
value of a firm’s equity held by politician equity holders ($Politician-Held Shares), and (3) the 
percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares held by politician equity holders (%Politician-Held 
Shares/MVE) (Cooper et al. 2010). Also, we include a set of control variables which are known 
to influence CSR performance. These controls are sales (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel 2001; 
Prior, Surroca, and Tribo 2008), leverage (Teoh et al. 1998), R&D expenses (McWilliams and 
Siegel 2001), stock return volatility, annual stock returns, sales growth, the number of business 
segments, firm age, industry competition (Herfindahl index, HHI), and indicators for high 
litigation industries, new economy industries, net loss firms, and S&P 500 firms. Appendix 
describes the variables in further details. 
IV. Empirical Results 
Main Results 
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To test the effects of politicians’ equity holding (i.e., whether a firm-year is a POF or not) 
on firms’ CSR performance, Table 3 regresses the numbers (factor scores) of CSR strengths, 
concerns, and total on the lagged indicator variable for DPolitician Holding and the control 
variables including the respective lagged dependent. The key research variable of our interest 
(DPolitician Holding) is lagged by one year to accommodate the temporal delay between the 
initiation of politician equity holding and the adjustment of firm behavior to disclosure of the 
investment event. This lagged variable also allows us to partially address issues of reverse 
causality and simultaneity. Our full sample results demonstrate that CSR performance improves 
when there are one or more politicians holding shares in a firm. Specifically, DPolitician 
Holding is positively associated with the number of CSR strengths (β=0.092, p-value=0.010) and 
the strength factor score (β=0.038, p-value=0.008). By contrast, we find no evidence of an 
increase in CSR concerns. Overall, this yields higher overall CSR performance both in the 
number of strengths vs. concerns (β=0.102, p-value=0.030) and total CSR factor score (β=0.042, 
p-value=0.018).  
< Insert Table 3 About Here > 
Endogeneity Controls 
We acknowledge endogeneity issues in our investigation of the relationship between 
politician equity holdings and CSR performance. There are several types of endogeneity that 
may arise in our research setting. They include selection bias, reverse causality, heterogeneity of 
politician investment stakes, and correlated omitted variable bias. We address each of these 
concerns using appropriate econometric techniques. 
Coarsened Exact Matching 
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Among the types of endogeneity, we are most concerned with the potential selection bias. 
As previously discussed, politicians may skew their investments toward socially responsible 
firms with positive CSR performance due to the attention paid to their investments by the general 
public and activist groups.  As our first means of addressing this issue, we adopt coarsened exact 
matching (CEM) (Iacus et al. 2012). With CEM, POFs and Non-POFs are matched based on 
year, leverage, sales, R&D expense, return volatility, sales growth, HHI, and our S&P 500 
indicator. Table 4, Panel A shows the matching criteria and performance. The matching 
substantially reduces the distance (ℒ") and the mean difference in the most matching criteria 
(except Sales Growth and HHI) between POFs and non-POFs. The matching process results in 
3,732 matched firm-year observations among which 1,952 (52.28%) firm-years are POFs (see 
Table 4, Panel B). We repeat our main analysis using this matched sample, controlling for any 
remaining imbalance in our criteria variables by including them as control variables (Blackwell 
et al. 2009). These results, reported in Table 4, Panel C, confirm our main finding of a positive 
association between politician equity holdings and CSR strengths and overall CSR performance. 
Again, we find no corresponding impact of politician equity holdings on CSR concerns.   
< Insert Table 4 About Here > 
First-Differencing 
Our main results, as well as our coarsened exact matching results, lag the politician 
holding variable by a year and include the lagged dependent variable. The former is done to 
alleviates concerns regarding reverse causality, while the latter is done to help overcome any 
biases due to correlated omitted variables. As an alternative method of addressing the two types 
of endogeneity, we report first-differenced estimators in Table 5. The table reports results of 
regressions of the first difference in our CSR performance measures (i.e., CSRt – CSRt-1) on 
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changes in the independent variables. First, Table 5, Panel A presents the results for the changes 
in the transition of politician holding status (i.e., transition between POFs and non-POFs).11 Our 
first-differenced estimation results find that both CSR strengths and concerns increase in the year 
following the introduction of the first politician shareholder. The indicator variable DPolitician 
Holdings: 0 to 1 is positive and significant for both strengths (β=0.172, p-value=0.001) and 
concerns ((β=0.127, p-value=0.004) in their numbers. These increases in both CSR strengths and 
concerns offset each other to yield an insignificant effect on overall CSR performance (Total: 
β=0.045 p-value=0.487). The use of CSR factor scores instead of count data confirms these 
results. By contrast, we see an overall increase in overall CSR performance which accompanies 
the last politician shareholder leaving the firm. This effect is not driven by increased CSR 
strengths (β=0.100, p-value=0.120) but is instead driven by a significant negative association 
with the number of CSR concerns (β=-0.122, p-value=0.016). This results in the improved 
overall CSR performance (β=0.222, p-value=0.008). This result is not confirmed using factor 
scores, however. In sum, the table provides noteworthy evidence of an asymmetric effect of 
politician equity holdings on CSR performance, where gaining politician shareholders is 
associated with increased CSR strengths and concerns while losing all politician shareholders 
yields reduced CSR concerns without a corresponding decrease in CSR strengths. 
< Insert Table 5 About Here > 
Heterogeneity of Politician Equity Stakes 
Thus far, we have only considered the “mere presence” effect of whether the firm has a 
politician shareholder. This methodology disregards the potential impact of marginal 
                                                
11 To recognize potential asymmetry, we separate the transition from non-POFs to POFs (DPolitician Holdings: 0 to 
1) and vice versa (Dpolitician Holdings: 1 to 0) instead of simply using the change in the indicator variable that 
would have carried -1 (from 1 to 0), 0 (no change), or 1 (from 0 to 1). 
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increases/decreases in the investment stake of politician shareholders coinciding with changes in 
the number of politicians holding a firm’s shares and/or the overall size and proportional 
ownership they hold.  This is an important consideration given the increased scrutiny a firm is 
likely to receive when they have several politician shareholders as opposed to a one or two. 
Similarly, larger investments represent stronger economic incentives to engage in pro-firm 
behaviors (i.e. through regulatory or legislative action). The first-difference estimation allows us 
to not only address endogeneity but also to examine the marginal effects of the extent of political 
and economic interest on firms’ CSR behavior. In Table 5, Panels B through D, we present the 
results for the changes in the number of politician shareholders (#Politicians Holding Shares), the 
size of politicians’ holdings ($Politician-Held Shares), and the ownership proportion of the 
holdings (%Politician-Held Shares/MVE). 
In Table 5, Panels B and C, we see that that both the number of politicians holding a 
firm’s equity and the size of their investments are positively associated with both CSR strengths 
and concerns. These results are consistent using both count data and factor scores. We do not, 
however, find similar results using the share of overall equity held by politicians’ holdings (as 
reported in Table 5, Panel D).  
Taken together, these findings suggest an important implication for our main results: 
namely that the association between the politicians’ equity holdings and firms’ CSR behavior 
does not arise from formal governance or monitoring mechanisms. This is understandable given 
our earlier finding that the average politician ownership stake represents only 0.006% of total 
equity, with a maximum level of approximately 2%. It is clear, both from their proportional 
ownership and from the results in Table 5, Panel D, that politicians are not in a position to exert 
formal control over the firms in which they invest. Thus, there appears to be some implicit 
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mechanism in effect such that the political and/or economic interests of politicians are associated 
with the CSR performance of firms they invest in. 
Differential Influence of Politician Equity Holders 
As noted earlier, politicians make selective investment decisions from which they expect 
to realize benefit. These benefits may not be limited solely to financial gains, however, but may 
also extend to such concerns as generating campaign contributions or post-legislative 
employment opportunities (i.e. board or executive positions). It is not unreasonable, however, to 
speculate that economically rational decision-making dominates their portfolio allocation 
decisions. A plausible alternative explanation for our results, therefore, may be that firms with 
strong CSR represent relatively sound investments from a strictly economic standpoint. This 
alternative explanation suggests a potential selection bias issue: the identification of firms as 
POF or non-POF is not random, but instead is an outcome of politicians’ selection. Recognizing 
the material impact such bias may have on our results, we follow Heckman’s two-stage method 
to correct for the suspected selection bias (Heckman 1979; Lennox, Francis, & Wang 2012). We 
first estimate the likelihood of politicians’ selection (i.e., firms being POFs) in the first stage and 
use the estimated hazard rate or inverse Mills ratio (usually denoted with λ) as a control in our 
second stage estimations. 
Table 6 reports the first-stage estimation of the likelihood of a firms’ having at least one 
politicians among its shareholders (i.e., POFs) using a Probit model. We include market-to-book 
ratio (MtB) as an instrument to meet the exclusion restriction condition for a more credible 
estimation in the process. Market-to-book is well recognized as a predictor for the future stock 
returns and firm growth (e.g., Penman 1996; Reggiani and Penman 2009; Lakonishok et al. 
1994), which makes the indicator an essential input for investment decisions. Nevertheless, there 
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is no clear theoretical prediction or empirical evidence that the ratio influences CSR activities. In 
addition, we find that it has little correlation with any of our CSR indicators (see Table 2 for 
specific coefficient and significance values). These characteristics make MtB a plausible 
instrument which meets the exclusion restriction for use in our Heckman selection model. 
Results reported in Table 6 suggest that politicians likely invest in firms with larger market-to-
book ratios, lower leverage, larger sales, larger R&D investment, lower return volatility, greater 
product market competition, and larger establishment (S&P 500).  
< Insert Table 6 About Here > 
The results of our second stage estimations are reported in Table 7. We test the marginal 
effects of political and economic interests on firms’ CSR performance. To this end, we examine 
whether and how the number of politician shareholders (#Politicians Holding Shares in Panel A) 
and the size of their investment ($Politician-Held Shares in Panel B) affect the number of CSR 
indicators of strengths, concerns, and the overall performance. Each panel is separated into three 
groups of columns: one group for CSR strengths, another for CSR concerns, and a third for total 
CSR performance. The column (1) results estimate the impact of the number of politicians 
holding shares in Panel A and the monetary value of their investments in Panel B. The results 
from both panels provide additional support for our previous findings using differenced 
regressions (from Table 5). Specifically, higher numbers of politician shareholders and higher 
politicians’ investment values (in dollars) are associated with increased CSR strengths (β=0.009, 
p-value=0.001 in Panel A; β=0.037, p-value=0.001 in Panel B) and CSR concerns (β=0.010, p-
value<0.001 in Panel A; β=0.033, p-value=0.002 in Panel B). The overall impact on total CSR 
performance is insignificant as these increased strengths and concerns offset each other 
(β=0.000, p-value=0.973 in Panel A; β=0.009, p-value=0.643 in Panel B).  
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We posit that increased scrutiny over politicians in their pursuit of the public’s well-being 
drives the positive effect of politician equity holdings on CSR strengths. If this is true, we should 
find the positive association between the extent of interest and CSR strengths is strongest for 
politicians who both attract greater attention from the public and the media and who are able to 
exert their influence to the benefit of firms in which they invest. On the other hand, we also 
argue that politicians can earn economic or financial gains as far as they can exercise their 
influence to favor the firms of their investment (in legally viable manners, for sure). Firms may 
opportunistically exploit the politicians’ rational self-interest by increasing their CSR concerns 
with the expectation that influential politician shareholders will act to protect their own 
investment (i.e., the firms themselves) from the potential negative consequences of such actions.  
To capture the confluence of public scrutiny and exercisable political influence, we 
explore four empirical proxies which distinguish more and less influential (or powerful) 
politicians from each other. First, we consider the members of federal congress both in the 
Senate and the House of Representatives as being subject to the heightened public attention and 
politically more influential over firm-specific affairs than executive branch officials and other 
politicians in State congresses. Second, we study the federal congresspersons’ political affiliation 
and consider differences in political considerations between the two largest parties (i.e., 
Democratic and Republican). Third, the knowledge of the federal congresspersons’ party 
membership allows us to distinguish the investments of congresspersons from the governing 
party from those of the out-of-power party.12 Fourth, we investigate the committee assignments 
of federal legislators and consider those who sit on committees that regulate firms in which they 
                                                
12 During the sample period from 2004 to 2013, there is a single presidential transition from George W. Bush 
(Republican) to Barack Obama (Democrat) in 2009. 
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are invested as being relatively more powerful from the perspective of the firm.13 We use the 
Fama-French 48 industry classification system to identify industries that are within the purview 
of each committee and match the them against (1) a firm’s primary industry and (2) all industries 
that a firm and its segments belong to.  
Column (2) of each grouping tests the impact of congressperson shareholders on CSR 
performance. In Panel A, we find that a larger number of congresspersons holding shares is 
associated with more CSR strengths (β=0.007, p-value=0.005), while the number of the other 
types of politicians (thus considered less influential) has no association with the number of CSR 
strengths (β=0.048, p-value=0.227). For CSR concerns, this panel shows that more concerns are 
observed when more congresspersons hold a firm’s shares (β=0.013, p-value<0.001). In contrast, 
a firm exhibits less concerns when more non-congressperson politicians hold shares, (β=-0.083, 
p-value=0.002). In total, while the overall CSR performance does not change with the number of 
congresspersons (β=-0.004, p-value=0.180), it improves with the number of non-congressperson 
politicians (β=0.135, p-value=0.006).  
< Insert Table 7 About Here > 
Columns (3) through (6) of Table 7 provide mixed results for the differential impact of 
influential politicians on CSR strengths, but consistent results for CSR concerns and the overall 
CSR performance measure. First, we find some evidence that politicians who are more 
influential and, as such, subject to greater public scrutiny stimulate improved CSR strengths (i.e., 
Congresspersons in Column (2), Influential Committee (S) in Column (6) (β=0.012, p-
value<0.001)). Consistent with prior literature on differences in CSR focus between U.S. 
                                                
13 A politician is considered relatively more powerful, for example, if they own shares in an oil company and sit on 
an environmental or energy committee, since such committees help develop laws and regulations for the oil 
industry. By contrast, a firm with a politician shareholder who sat on the Health and Human Services committee. 
would not expect that politician to be able to exert much influence on their behalf through their committee work. 
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political parties (Rubin 2008; DiGiuli & Kostovesky 2014), Democrat (one of the two major 
parties) congressional shareholders are also associated with more CSR strengths (β=0.018, p-
value=0.022). The positive association between the number of influential politicians holding 
shares and CSR strengths is in contrast with the coinciding absence of association for the less 
influential politicians in Columns (2), (3), and (6). Results for the impact of influential 
politicians on CSR concerns, by contrast, show a consistent and significant positive association 
between more influential politicians and increased CSR concerns.  By contrast, the holdings of 
less influential politicians are either negatively or insignificantly associated with CSR concerns. 
Accordingly, we find that the overall CSR performance improves with the number of less 
influential politicians. The holdings of more influential politicians, however, lead to, at best, no 
change in overall CSR performance (columns (1) through (3) and (6)) and, at worst, an overall 
deterioration in CSR performance (in Columns (4) and (5)) for firms.  
Our findings in Panel B, where the total value of politician shareholdings is used in place 
of the number of politician shareholders, largely replicate the pattern of results observed in Panel 
A.  We find that the total value of investment is associated with greater CSR strengths regardless 
of politician influence (in all columns from (2) to (6)). Consistent with the findings in Panel A, 
the number of CSR concerns is larger in firms where influential politicians have larger 
investments. Despite inconsistency in the CSR concerns and the investment of less influential 
politicians, the overall CSR performance is not affected by the size of influential politicians’ 
holdings (in all columns), but it increases with the size of less influential politicians’ holdings (in 
Columns (2), (3), and (4) under #Total). 
Divestment Incentives and Politicians’ Investment Behavior 
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In order for firms to exploit the power and influence of politician shareholders, firms 
must be confident that politicians will not divest their shares in the firm when CSR concerns 
arise. This is due to the elimination of incentive alignment which occurs when politicians sell out 
of their shares in the firm. We therefore examine politician investment behavior across various 
levels (particularly at lower levels) of CSR performance to determine whether or not politician 
investments persist for weak CSR firms.  
Table 8 shows the distribution of politicians’ shareholdings across the overall CSR 
performance in deciles. The CSR performance deciles are constructed by one-digit SIC for each 
year. Table 8 shows that the number of politician equity holders is concentrated among firms at 
the 10th decile (i.e. with relatively strong CSR performance). Despite this, there are clearly 
clusters of politician shareholders at all deciles of CSR performance. Politician ownership levels 
trend upward (though not linearly) from the lowest decile through the highest decile of CSR 
performance.  As shown graphically in Figure 1, the size of holdings ($Holdings) follows the 
similar pattern as in the number of politician holders, while the ownership proportion 
(%Holdings) lacks any pattern. Notably, the number of owners and the value of politicians’ 
holdings are not the smallest in the poorest CSR firms. Despite their slight increases in CSR 
deciles, we find little evidence that politicians’ holding of the poorest CSR firms differs from 
that of the other firms with relatively better CSR performance both in the number of politician 
shareholders and the size of politician holdings.   
< Insert Table 8 About Here > 
< Insert Figure 1 About Here > 
Table 9 illustrates how the politicians respond to the changes in poor CSR performance. 
We regress politician shareholdings by politician types on the one-year lagged changes in the 
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CSR measures. Unlike the typical tabular presentation, each row represents a regression where 
the dependent is listed in rows and the independent variables are listed in columns.14 To 
accommodate the evident off-track behavior (i.e., a jump in the holdings of firms with the 
poorest CSR performance) and likely asymmetry in the behavior, we include the dummies for 
Into Poorest CSR Decile and From Poorest CSR Decile. The former indicates the decile change 
is made into the 1st decile in the total CSR measure which represents the poorest CSR 
performance, while the latter indicates the change is made out of the worst CSR performance 
decile. The table does not reveal any systematic evidence that politicians shy away from poor 
CSR firms or remove them from their investment portfolio. However, results from these 
regressions provide relatively strong support for the contention that politicians shed their 
investments when CSR performance falls to within the lowest decile of CSR performance. This 
is reasonable as politicians investing in extremely poor CSR firms would face substantial 
political pressure from relevant stakeholder groups and/or the general public such that the 
political costs may exceed any financial benefits from the investment and exercise of their 
influence. It does not appear that moving from the poorest CSR decile into a higher decile is 
sufficient, however, to bring politician shareholders back to the firm. To the contrary, this result 
is not reflected in the overall value of politician equity holdings where only non-influential 
politicians exhibit significant reactions to switches to or from the poorest CSR decile. 
< Insert Table 9 About Here > 
V. Conclusion 
 This study examines the relationship between politician’s equity holdings and the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of companies. We discuss two distinct 
                                                
14 The full set of control variables is included in each regression, but are not reported in order to preserve space.  
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incentives arising from politicians’ shareholdings: political and economic incentives. The 
publicly available personal finance information of politicians’ holdings invites the public’s or the 
relevant stakeholders’ demand for the politicians’ influence for the good. To the contrary, 
politicians’ economic incentive for personal wealth increase allows poor CSR firms to exploit 
the politicians’ predisposition toward them. Our results from a battery of tests provide evidence 
supporting the conjecture. Firms with political shareholders engage in both more socially 
responsible behaviors (i.e. increase the number of CSR strengths) and more socially irresponsible 
behaviors (i.e. increase the number of CSR concerns). These results appear to be driven by the 
number of politicians holding a firm’s stock and the size of politicians’ total investment in a firm 
which are presumably associated with intensity of political and economic incentives that 
politicians encounter. As politicians scarcely hold significant or controlling shares of a firm, we 
find no evidence of similar effects of politicians’ ownership stake. Further, we adopt multiple 
measures to address potential endogeneity issues to check the robustness of the findings and 
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This figure plots the politicians’ shareholdings in the number (#), the dollar value ($), and the ownership proportion 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample (N=7,406) 
 VARIABLES Mean SD Min Median Max 
#Strengths  2.489 3.360 0.000 1.000 22.000 
#Concerns 2.358 2.268 0.000 2.000 18.000 
#Total 0.131 3.295 -11.000 0.000 19.000 
Strengths - Factor 1.014 1.389 0.000 0.440 9.503 
Concerns - Factor 0.621 0.994 -0.221 0.333 6.834 
Total - Factor 0.295 1.374 -4.052 0.000 8.435 
DPolitician Holding 0.554 0.497 0.000 1.000 1.000 
#Politicians Holding Shares 5.027 13.329 0.000 1.000 176.000 
$Politician-Held Shares 452,208 3,385,744 0 7,034 168,000,000 
%Politician-Held Shares/MVE 0.003 0.039 0.000 0.000 1.806 
Leverage 0.178 0.148 0.000 0.168 0.806 
Ln(Sale) 7.869 1.499 1.085 7.740 13.070 
R&D Exp 216.392 861.222 0.000 2.803 10,991.000 
Return Volatility 0.024 0.011 0.006 0.021 0.108 
Annual Return 1.271 4.110 0.034 1.090 245.562 
Sales Growth 1.126 5.055 0.186 1.035 435.738 
#Business Segments 6.989 5.678 0.000 6.000 30.000 
#Geographical Segments 8.752 7.884 0.000 6.000 83.000 
#Operating Segments 2.166 5.580 0.000 0.000 41.000 
Firm Age 26.640 16.656 0.000 22.000 64.000 
HHI 0.184 0.176 0.029 0.130 1.000 
High Litigation Industries 0.308 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000 
New Economy Firms 0.149 0.356 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Loss 0.107 0.309 0.000 0.000 1.000 




Panel B: Firms Held by Politicians vs. Not Held 
  






 VARIABLES  Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  Mean   Median   
#Strengths   3.472 2.000 3.863  1.266 1.000 2.017  -2.207 *** -1.000 *** 
#Concerns  2.743 2.000 2.636  1.879 2.000 1.578  -0.864 *** 0.000 *** 
#Total  0.729 0.000 3.747  -0.614 -1.000 2.428  -1.343 *** -1.000 *** 
Strengths - Factor  1.419 0.835 1.591  0.509 0.000 0.848  -0.910 *** -0.835 *** 
Concerns - Factor  0.849 0.407 1.161  0.337 0.000 0.631  -0.512 *** -0.407 *** 
Total - Factor  0.579 0.212 1.563  -0.059 -0.208 0.985  -0.638 *** -0.420 *** 
#Politicians Holding Shares  9.067 3.000 16.847  - - -  - - 
$Politician-Held Shares   815K 56.5K 4,514K  - - -  - - 
%Politician-Held Shares/MVE  0.006 0.0004 0.052  - - -  - - 
Leverage  0.181 0.173 0.139  0.174 0.158 0.158  -0.007 * -0.016 *** 
Ln(Sale)  8.420 8.381 1.504  7.184 7.125 1.175  -1.236 *** -1.257 *** 
R&D Exp  358.413 10.200 1,131.192  39.683 0.000 127.585  -318.730 *** -10.200 *** 
Return Volatility  0.021 0.019 0.010  0.026 0.024 0.012  0.005 *** 0.005 *** 
Annual Return  1.277 1.091 4.567  1.264 1.089 3.460  -0.012 -0.002 
Sales Growth  1.184 1.050 6.786  1.054 1.013 0.190  -0.130 -0.037 *** 
#Business Segments  7.209 6.000 6.034  6.715 6.000 5.190  -0.494 *** 0.000 
#Geographical Segments  9.205 7.000 8.206  8.190 6.000 7.426  -1.015 *** -1.000 *** 
#Operating Segments  2.609 0.000 6.157  1.614 0.000 4.708  -0.995 *** 0.000 *** 
Firm Age  29.209 25.000 17.763  23.443 19.000 14.548  -5.766 *** -6.000 *** 
HHI  0.180 0.127 0.176  0.187 0.135 0.176  0.007 * 0.008 *** 
High Litigation Industries  0.311 0.000 0.463  0.304 0.000 0.460  -0.007 0.000 
New Economy Firms  0.151 0.000 0.358  0.146 0.000 0.354  -0.005 0.000 
Loss  0.078 0.000 0.268  0.142 0.000 0.349  0.064 *** 0.000 *** 
S&P500  0.594 1.000 0.491  0.155 0.000 0.362  -0.439 *** -1.000 *** 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the sample (Panel A) and compares politician owned firms (POFs) and the others (Non-POFs) (Panel B). ***, **, 





Table 2: Correlations 



















































































































































































                        
[2] 0.366***                       
[3] 0.768*** -0.315***                      
[4] 0.326*** 0.189*** 0.203***                     
[5] 0.535*** 0.407*** 0.265*** 0.338***                    
[6] 0.139*** 0.110*** 0.066*** 0.120*** 0.284***                   
[7] -0.017 -0.018 -0.005 0.074*** 0.012 0.603***                  
[8] 0.007 -0.009 0.013 0.023* -0.013 -0.004 -0.007                 
[9] 0.073*** 0.087*** 0.015 0.023 -0.012 -0.009 -0.001 0.106***                
[10] 0.598*** 0.510*** 0.259*** 0.410*** 0.522*** 0.146*** -0.023* -0.008 0.196***               
[11] 0.489*** 0.243*** 0.332*** 0.184*** 0.621*** 0.170*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.039*** 0.347***              
[12] -0.237*** -0.012 -0.234*** -0.231*** -0.206*** -0.054*** 0.016 0.054*** -0.031** -0.297*** -0.123***             
[13] -0.018 -0.026* -0.000 0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 0.008 0.007 0.002 -0.010 0.005            
[14] -0.010 0.043*** -0.040*** 0.013 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.016 0.009 -0.002 0.003 0.074***           
[15] 0.086*** 0.106*** 0.015 0.043*** 0.101*** 0.064*** 0.023* -0.049*** 0.047*** 0.151*** 0.134*** -0.062*** 0.008 0.016          
[16] 0.128*** 0.117*** 0.050*** 0.064*** 0.114*** 0.045*** 0.000 -0.025* -0.115*** 0.087*** 0.162*** 0.026* -0.017 0.014 0.159***         
[17] 0.174*** 0.225*** 0.023* 0.089*** 0.114*** 0.021 -0.016 0.013 0.106*** 0.225*** 0.002 -0.033** -0.006 -0.005 -0.448*** 0.034**        
[18] 0.377*** 0.287*** 0.187*** 0.172*** 0.248*** 0.076*** -0.005 -0.061*** 0.146*** 0.444*** 0.190*** -0.239*** -0.055*** -0.022 0.246*** 0.084*** 0.117***       
[19] -0.027* 0.044*** -0.058*** -0.019 -0.051*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.022 0.001 0.116*** -0.102*** 0.000 0.019 0.017 0.052*** -0.060*** 0.040*** 0.060***      
[20] 0.053*** -0.080*** 0.109*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.043*** 0.012 0.039*** -0.237*** -0.071*** 0.188*** 0.066*** -0.010 -0.006 -0.146*** 0.005 -0.153*** -0.196*** -0.202***     
[21] 0.035** -0.112*** 0.114*** 0.007 0.073*** -0.009 -0.014 0.047*** -0.187*** -0.155*** 0.145*** 0.065*** -0.011 -0.002 -0.062*** 0.077*** -0.123*** -0.215*** -0.272*** 0.522***    
[22] -0.072*** 0.009 -0.079*** -0.103*** -0.084*** -0.024* 0.021 0.006 0.113*** -0.121*** -0.037** 0.342*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.020 -0.011 0.016 -0.055*** -0.022 0.011 0.020   
[23] 0.566*** 0.386*** 0.311*** 0.445*** 0.386*** 0.111*** -0.012 0.040*** 0.119*** 0.687*** 0.268*** -0.246*** 0.004 -0.008 0.069*** 0.124*** 0.160*** 0.329*** -0.016 0.024* -0.001 -0.101***  




Table 3: Panel Regressions on an Indicator of Politicians’ Equity Holding 
   In Numbers  In Factor Scores 
 VARIABLES  Strengths Concerns Total  Strengths Concerns Total 
DPolitician Holding  0.092*** -0.005 0.102**  0.038*** -0.003 0.042** 
  (0.035) (0.028) (0.047)  (0.014) (0.010) (0.018) 
Lagged Dependent   0.789*** 0.765*** 0.773***  0.796*** 0.781*** 0.781*** 
  (0.011) (0.014) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Leverage  -0.041 -0.184** 0.130  0.007 -0.039 0.062 
  (0.111) (0.088) (0.142)  (0.045) (0.033) (0.055) 
Ln(Sale)  0.181*** 0.124*** 0.073***  0.072*** 0.062*** 0.041*** 
  (0.019) (0.017) (0.025)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) 
R&D Exp  0.000*** 0.000 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return Volatility  -2.733 3.718*** -6.452***  -1.277* 0.985* -2.272*** 
  (1.717) (1.405) (2.208)  (0.694) (0.565) (0.854) 
Annual Return  -0.001 -0.008* 0.007  -0.001 -0.002* 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Sales Growth  -0.001** 0.023*** -0.024***  -0.000* 0.009*** -0.006*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
#Business Segments  0.000 0.003 -0.003  -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
#Geographical Segments  0.002 -0.000 0.002  0.000 0.001 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
#Operating Segments  0.010** 0.010*** 0.001  0.004** 0.004*** 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Firm Age  0.002* 0.000 0.003  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
HHI  -0.121 0.079 -0.205  -0.053 0.028 -0.077 
  (0.103) (0.077) (0.129)  (0.040) (0.029) (0.050) 
High Litigation Industries  0.068 0.028 0.046  0.026 0.019 0.022 
  (0.046) (0.040) (0.059)  (0.019) (0.015) (0.022) 
New Economy Firms  0.165*** 0.003 0.168**  0.070*** -0.012 0.075*** 
  (0.062) (0.045) (0.075)  (0.025) (0.018) (0.029) 
Loss  0.038 0.060 -0.017  0.015 0.021 -0.001 
  (0.051) (0.040) (0.067)  (0.021) (0.014) (0.025) 
S&P500  0.482*** -0.016 0.522***  0.197*** 0.012 0.216*** 
  (0.051) (0.040) (0.062)  (0.021) (0.015) (0.025) 
Constant  -1.220*** -0.287** -1.038***  -0.483*** -0.383*** -0.420*** 
  (0.141) (0.130) (0.184)  (0.058) (0.050) (0.073) 
         
Industry FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared  0.810 0.776 0.693  0.817 0.821 0.730 
N=7,406. This table presents the regressions of the number (factor score) of strength, concern, and total. The 
indicator of POFs, or DPolitician Holding, is lagged by a year (measured at year t-1), while the other variables are 
contemporaneous (measured at year t). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. In parentheses robust standard 
errors are shown. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Analysis of Coarsened Exact Matching Sample 
Panel A: Matching Criteria and Performance 
   Before Matching  After Matching  Bias Reduction 
Multivariate ℒ"   0.996   0.992     
Univariable  
 Distance 
(ℒ") Difference in Means  Distance (ℒ") Difference in Means  In 	ℒ" (%) 
Leverage  0.180 0.022  0.122 0.014  -0.058 -32.04% 
Ln(Sale)  0.501 1.584  0.403 1.074  -0.098 -19.50% 
R&D Exp  0.220 343.530  0.216 104.820  -0.004 -1.88% 
Return Volatility  0.279 -0.006  0.232 -0.005  -0.048 -17.03% 
Sales Growth  0.096 -0.001  0.102 0.009  0.006 5.77% 
HHI  0.089 -0.007  0.106 -0.023  0.017 19.30% 
S&P500  0.517 0.517  0.483 0.483  -0.034 -6.56% 
 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
Treatment Frequency (%) 
Non-POFs 1,781 47.72% 
POFs 1,951 52.28% 




Panel C: Panel Regressions with the Coarsened Exact Matching Sample 
   In Numbers  In Factor Scores 
 VARIABLES    Strengths Concerns Total  Strengths Concerns Total 
DPolitician Holding  0.272*** -0.067 0.377***  0.126*** -0.018 0.130*** 
  (0.069) (0.055) (0.090)  (0.028) (0.021) (0.035) 
Lagged Dependent   0.678*** 0.511*** 0.646***  0.677*** 0.579*** 0.686*** 
  (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Leverage  -0.524** -0.058 -0.474  -0.146 0.143* -0.121 
  (0.262) (0.209) (0.345)  (0.108) (0.082) (0.134) 
Ln(Sale)  0.164*** 0.359*** -0.097*  0.061*** 0.152*** -0.019 
  (0.042) (0.035) (0.055)  (0.017) (0.014) (0.021) 
R&D Exp  0.000 -0.001*** 0.001***  0.000 -0.000 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return Volatility  -3.009 7.047* -8.053  -1.107 2.325 -3.374 
  (4.576) (3.655) (6.019)  (1.881) (1.434) (2.335) 
Annual Return  -0.010 -0.018 0.008  -0.001 0.004 -0.006 
  (0.049) (0.039) (0.064)  (0.020) (0.015) (0.025) 
Sales Growth  -0.596*** 0.081 -0.771***  -0.260*** -0.015 -0.372*** 
  (0.205) (0.163) (0.269)  (0.084) (0.064) (0.104) 
#Business Segments  -0.025*** 0.017*** -0.040***  -0.011*** 0.008*** -0.018*** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
#Geographical Segments  0.012** 0.011*** 0.001  0.004** 0.008*** 0.000 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
#Operating Segments  0.007 0.020*** -0.008  0.002 0.008*** -0.004 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Firm Age  0.010*** -0.004** 0.016***  0.004*** -0.000 0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HHI  0.720** -0.214 0.890**  0.278** 0.214** 0.233 
  (0.327) (0.262) (0.431)  (0.135) (0.103) (0.167) 
High Litigation Industries  0.024 0.372*** -0.342***  0.009 0.184*** -0.090* 
  (0.098) (0.078) (0.129)  (0.040) (0.031) (0.050) 
New Economy Firms  0.357*** -0.179* 0.516***  0.136*** -0.136*** 0.216*** 
  (0.121) (0.096) (0.159)  (0.050) (0.038) (0.062) 
Loss  0.228** -0.199** 0.438***  0.108** -0.089** 0.145** 
  (0.112) (0.089) (0.147)  (0.046) (0.035) (0.057) 
S&P500  0.647*** 0.038 0.688***  0.271*** 0.010 0.318*** 
  (0.091) (0.071) (0.118)  (0.037) (0.028) (0.046) 
Constant  0.234 2.316** -1.856  0.293 0.589 -0.040 
  (1.168) (0.933) (1.538)  (0.480) (0.366) (0.597) 
         
Industry FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared  0.662 0.545 .558  0.669 0.620 0.596 
This table reports the results of coarsened exact matching, and presents the regressions of the number (factor score) 
of strength, concern, and total using the CEM matched sample (N=3,235). The indicator of POFs, or DPolitician 
Holding, is lagged by a year (measured at year t-1), while the other variables are contemporaneous (measured at 
year t). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. In parentheses robust standard errors are shown. ***, **, and 
* represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 5: Differenced Regressions 
Panel A: Regressions on Change in an Indicator of Politicians’ Holding (N=7,025) 
 Changes in  In Numbers  In Factor Scores 
 VARIABLES  Strengths Concerns Total  Strengths Concerns Total 
DPolitician Holdings: 0 to 1  0.172*** 0.127*** 0.045  0.057*** 0.068*** -0.011 
  (0.050) (0.044) (0.065)  (0.020) (0.015) (0.025) 
DPolitician Holdings: 1 to 0  0.100 -0.122** 0.222***  0.032 0.018 0.048 
  (0.064) (0.051) (0.083)  (0.027) (0.017) (0.033) 
Leverage  -0.104 0.029 -0.133  -0.016 0.078 0.025 
  (0.261) (0.221) (0.345)  (0.105) (0.075) (0.127) 
Ln(Sale)  0.097 0.325*** -0.228*  0.044 0.029 -0.054 
  (0.094) (0.078) (0.125)  (0.038) (0.030) (0.050) 
R&D Exp  0.000** 0.000 0.000**  0.000** 0.000 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return Volatility  -6.543*** 11.281*** -17.824***  -2.727*** 4.349*** -4.713*** 
  (1.695) (1.482) (2.322)  (0.703) (0.532) (0.872) 
Annual Return  -0.002 -0.008*** 0.006*  -0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales Growth  0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000  0.000** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
#Business Segments  -0.035** -0.040*** 0.005  -0.022*** -0.002 -0.010 
  (0.016) (0.011) (0.019)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
#Geographical Segments  0.015* 0.012 0.004  0.000 0.006** -0.005 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
#Operating Segments  0.020 0.021 -0.001  0.002 0.017*** -0.008 
  (0.017) (0.014) (0.021)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) 
HHI  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High Litigation Industries  0.106 0.203 -0.097  0.069 0.196* -0.016 
  (0.271) (0.295) (0.385)  (0.111) (0.112) (0.145) 
New Economy Firms  -0.119 -0.405 0.286  -0.112 -0.080 -0.034 
  (0.161) (0.275) (0.318)  (0.104) (0.119) (0.107) 
Loss  0.258 -0.307 0.565  0.161 -0.127 0.430 
  (0.256) (0.449) (0.645)  (0.135) (0.283) (0.391) 
S&P500  0.034 0.010 0.024  0.009 0.030** -0.006 
  (0.057) (0.047) (0.077)  (0.023) (0.015) (0.028) 
Constant  0.237 -0.005 0.242  0.120 0.019 0.118 
  (0.220) (0.046) (0.262)  (0.108) (0.032) (0.119) 
         
Industry FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 




Panel B: Regressions on Change in the Number of Politicians Holding Shares (N=6,252) 
 Changes in  In Numbers  In Factor Scores 




0.009** 0.009*** -0.001 
 
0.003* 0.003** 0.000 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Control Variables  included included included  included included included 
         
Industry FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared  0.007 0.019 0.012  0.008 0.022 0.009 
 
Panel C: Regressions on Change in the Size of Politicians’ Holdings (N=6,252) 
 Changes in  In Numbers  In Factor Scores 
 VARIABLES  Strengths Concerns Total  Strengths Concerns Total 
Ln($Politician-Held   0.010** 0.015*** -0.005  0.003** 0.004*** -0.002 
      Shares+1)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Control Variables  included included included  included included included 
         
Industry FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared  0.007 0.019 0.012  0.008 0.022 0.009 
 
Panel D: Regressions on Change in the Share of Politicians’ Holdings (N=6,252) 
 Changes in  In Numbers  In Factor Scores 
 VARIABLES  Strengths Concerns Total  Strengths Concerns Total 
Ln(%Politician-Held   0.341 -0.052 0.393  0.097 0.031 -0.033 
       Shares+1/MVE)  (0.216) (0.050) (0.173)  (0.107) (0.050) (0.101) 
Control Variables  included included included  included included included 
         
Industry FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared  0.006 0.016 0.012  0.007 0.021 0.009 
This table presents the regressions of the changes in number (factor score) of strength, concern, and total on the 
changes in the independent variables. The politician holding measures (DPolitician Holding, $Politician-Held 
Shares, and %Politician-Held Share/MVE) are lagged by a year (measured at year t-1), while the other variables are 
contemporaneous (measured at year t). In parentheses robust standard errors are shown. ***, **, and * represent 




Table 6: Heckman First Stage Selection Model 
 
VARIABLES MtB Leverage Ln(Sale) R&D Exp 
Return 
Volatility Sales Growth HHI S&P500 Constant 
Coefficient 0.001** -0.500*** 0.202*** 0.000*** -14.280*** 0.133 -0.245** 0.640*** -1.457*** 
(Standard error) (0.001) (0.117) (0.017) (0.000) (1.618) (0.086) (0.098) (0.046) (0.165) 
This table presents the first-stage selection model in the Heckman Selection-Bias Correction. It estimates the likelihood of politician owned firms using a Probit 
regression on the above-listed selection-inducing variables and fixed effects for firms and years. The estimation is based on 6,566 observations, and its Wald-




Table 7: Heckman Second Stage Estimation 
Panel A: The Number of Politician Owners with Differential Influence 
   #Strengths  #Concerns  #Total 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
#Politicians   0.009***       0.010***       0.000      
  Holding Shares  (0.003)       (0.002)       (0.003)      
#Congresspersons    0.007***       0.013***       -0.004     
   (0.003)       (0.002)       (0.003)     
#Democrat     0.018**       0.015***       0.006    
  Congresspersons    (0.008)       (0.005)       (0.010)    
#Republican     -0.000       0.011***       -0.011    
  Congresspersons    (0.006)       (0.004)       (0.007)    
#Ruling Party      0.005       0.025***       -0.020***   
  Congresspersons     (0.005)       (0.004)       (0.006)   
#Influential       -0.006       0.017***       -0.023***  
  Committee (F) a      (0.006)       (0.004)       (0.008)  
#Influential        0.012***       0.011***       0.002 
  Committee (S) a       (0.003)       (0.002)       (0.004) 
#Other Politicians    0.048 0.070 0.013** 0.024*** -0.019   -0.083*** -0.088*** -0.007* 0.003 0.001   0.135*** 0.162*** 0.022*** 0.023*** -0.017 
  Holding Shares   (0.048) (0.043) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014)   (0.027) (0.029) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)   (0.049) (0.053) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) 
Lagged Dependent  0.800*** 0.799*** 0.798*** 0.799*** 0.797*** 0.801***  0.752*** 0.751*** 0.751*** 0.751*** 0.751*** 0.752***  0.779*** 0.778*** 0.778*** 0.776*** 0.776*** 0.779*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lambda(λ)  -1.063*** -1.066*** -1.041*** -1.074*** -1.051*** -1.050***  0.083 0.059 0.078 0.081 0.064 0.081  -1.098*** -1.074*** -1.065*** -1.109*** -1.067*** -1.080*** 
  (0.320) (0.320) (0.320) (0.320) (0.320) (0.320)  (0.227) (0.226) (0.227) (0.226) (0.227) (0.227)  (0.397) (0.396) (0.396) (0.396) (0.396) (0.397) 
Constant  1.630** 1.649** 1.614** 1.655** 1.583** 1.592**  0.296 0.288 0.252 0.235 0.330 0.290  1.243 1.259 1.257 1.327 1.153 1.201 
  (0.790) (0.788) (0.788) (0.789) (0.788) (0.788)  (0.554) (0.551) (0.552) (0.550) (0.552) (0.552)  (0.975) (0.972) (0.972) (0.972) (0.971) (0.973) 
Control Variables  Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.  Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.  Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Observations  6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566  6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566  6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 
Industry FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald-Chi2  8,028 8,038 8,073 8,030 8,066 8,063  10,773 10,861 10,856 10,901 10,824 10,813  6,881 6,913 6,928 6,908 6,922 6,892 
p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Panel B: The Size of Holdings of Politicians with Differential Influence 
   #Strengths  #Concerns  #Total 
VARIABLES b  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
$Politician-   0.037**       0.033***       0.009      
  Held Shares+1  (0.015)       (0.011)       (0.018)      
$Congresspersons    0.032***       0.025***       0.010     
   (0.012)       (0.009)       (0.015)     
$Democrat     0.015**       0.013***       0.004    
  Congresspersons    (0.021)       (0.005)       (0.008)    
$Republican     0.020***       0.011**       0.011    
  Congresspersons    (0.008)       (0.005)       (0.009)    
$Ruling Party      0.014**       0.010**       0.007   
  Congresspersons     (0.007)       (0.005)       (0.008)   
$Influential       0.012*       0.013**       0.001  
  Committee (F) a      (0.007)       (0.005)       (0.009)  
$Influential        0.018*       0.009       0.012 
  Committee (S) a       (0.010)       (0.007)       (0.012) 
$Other Politicians    0.023*** 0.018** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.018***   -0.006 -0.007 0.015*** 0.007 0.012**   0.030*** 0.026*** 0.010 0.020** 0.008 
  Holding Shares   (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Lagged Dependent  0.803*** 0.801*** 0.799*** 0.800*** 0.800*** 0.801***  0.760*** 0.762*** 0.760*** 0.760*** 0.761*** 0.760***  0.779*** 0.778*** 0.777*** 0.778*** 0.778*** 0.778*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lambda(λ)  -0.940*** -0.953*** -0.938*** -0.931*** -0.943*** -0.956***  0.211 0.206 0.217 0.219 0.215 0.201  -1.098*** -1.113*** -1.107*** -1.098*** -1.109*** -1.108*** 
  (0.318) (0.317) (0.317) (0.318) (0.317) (0.318)  (0.227) (0.227) (0.227) (0.227) (0.227) (0.227)  (0.394) (0.393) (0.393) (0.394) (0.394) (0.394) 
Constant  0.920 1.087 1.248 1.161 1.152 1.192  -0.426 -0.365 -0.214 -0.200 -0.193 -0.161  1.171 1.312 1.335 1.221 1.210 1.208 
  (0.243) (0.166) (0.109) (0.136) (0.139) (0.128)  (0.444) (0.510) (0.698) (0.717) (0.726) (0.771)  (0.229) (0.176) (0.165) (0.204) (0.209) (0.212) 
Control Variables  Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.  Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.  Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Observations  6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566  6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566  6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 6,566 
Industry FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald-Chi2  8,116 8,143 8,153 8,138 8,144 8,113  10,638 10,637 10,644 10,637 10,627 10,633  6,882 6,904 6,903 6,885 6,897 6,881 
p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                      
This table presents the regressions of the number of strength, concern, and total on the politician holdings in different classifications. All the politician holding 
measures (both in #Politicians Holding Shares and $Politician-Held Shares) are lagged by a year (measured at year t-1), while the other variables are 
contemporaneous (measured at year t). All the control variables are not displayed in the interest of space. In parentheses robust standard errors are shown. ***, 
**, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. a. ‘F’ is for firms, while ‘S’ is for segment. b. The values of investment 
($holdings) are natural log transformed.   
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Table 8: CSR Performance and Politician Holdings 
CSR Total Deciles Freq. CSR Total #Owners $Holdings %Holdings 
1 : Poorest 1,071 -3.965 4.343 363,254 0.003 
2 1,068 -2.131 2.281 223,524 0.004 
3 1,021 -1.106 2.544 193,787 0.002 
4 278 -1.029 2.083 291,902 0.008 
5 1,245 -0.092 2.836 411,160 0.003 
6 205 0.741 6.366 578,389 0.002 
7 819 1.015 3.882 677,185 0.007 
8 401 2.167 5.601 538,430 0.003 
9 714 3.577 10.007 635,401 0.001 
10: Best 584 7.904 16.372 1,006,191 0.002 
Total 7,406 0.131 5.027 452,208 0.003 
      
[0] Poorest CSR Decile 1,071 -3.965 4.343 363,254 0.003 
[1] The other nine deciles 6,335 0.824 5.143 467,247 0.003 
[2] The others excluding  5,751  4.002 412,519 0.003 
      the top decile      
      
t-statistics for Mean Difference Tests    
[0] vs. All the others [1] 1.817** 0.930 0.382 
[0] vs. The others excluding the top decile [2] -0.909 0.431 0.459 
This table presents the CSR performance in their deciles. The deciles are computed by one-digit SIC every year. 





Table 9: Politician Holding Changes Following Poorest CSR Performance 
VARIABLES  Dependent in #Politicians Holding Shares  Dependent in Ln($Politician-Held Shares+1) 
(↓Dependent)                         (Independent→) 












All Politicians  -0.799*** -0.398 0.024  0.456 -0.293 -0.058 
  (0.258) (0.268) (0.038)  (0.322) (0.283) (0.036) 
Congresspersons  -0.906*** -0.441 0.032  0.493 -0.399 -0.063* 
  (0.285) (0.296) (0.042)  (0.320) (0.282) (0.035) 
Others  -0.064** -0.053 -0.003  -0.335** -0.180 -0.019 
  (0.025) (0.033) (0.005)  (0.154) (0.176) (0.027) 
Democrat Congresspersons  -0.269 -0.185 0.032  -0.175 -0.251 -0.011 
  (0.168) (0.129) (0.021)  (0.255) (0.243) (0.032) 
Republican Congresspersons  -0.609*** 0.084 0.042  0.363 -0.156 -0.063* 
  (0.172) (0.216) (0.030)  (0.286) (0.265) (0.034) 
Others  -0.096* -0.378*** -0.044***  -0.428*** 0.093 -0.046* 
  (0.049) (0.083) (0.015)  (0.159) (0.202) (0.026) 
Ruling Party Congresspersons   -0.294* -0.224 0.024  -0.019 -0.356 -0.012 
  (0.157) (0.138) (0.022)  (0.279) (0.255) (0.032) 
Others  -0.680*** -0.255 0.005  0.245 0.014 -0.036 
  (0.205) (0.217) (0.032)  (0.288) (0.263) (0.035) 
Congresspersons Sitting on  -0.729*** -0.083 0.065**  -0.221 0.060 -0.016 
Influential Committees (Firm)  (0.196) (0.175) (0.026)  (0.269) (0.265) (0.032) 
Others  -0.245* -0.396** -0.036  0.510* -0.124 -0.060 
  (0.148) (0.190) (0.029)  (0.299) (0.276) (0.037) 
Congresspersons Sitting on  -0.808*** -0.448* 0.028  0.345 -0.323 -0.101*** 
Influential Committees (Segment)  (0.253) (0.259) (0.038)  (0.309) (0.282) (0.036) 
Others  -0.166* -0.031 0.002  -0.221 0.525** 0.066** 
  (0.091) (0.095) (0.015)  (0.224) (0.254) (0.033) 
This table presents the regressions of the changes in politicians’ holdings (the number of politician owners and the size of holdings) on the changes in the overall 
CSR performance. Politicians are divided into (1) Federal Congresspersons and the others, (2) Democrat and Republican Congresspersons and the others, (3) 
Ruling Party Congresspersons and the others, and (4) Congresspersons sitting on Influential Committees and the others. The key independent variables (i.e., 
Into/From Poorest CSR Decile and the Deciles on Total) are lagged by a year (measured at year t-1), while the other variables are contemporaneous (measured at 
year t). All the control variables are not displayed in the interest of space. In parentheses robust standard errors are shown. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Appendix: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
#Strengths 
 
The number of KLD strengths. The sum of all counts in strength indicators 
reported in KLD’s six sections: Environment, Community, Human Rights, 
Employee Relations, Diversity, Product, and Corporate Governance. Thus, 
it is computed as ∑Strengths = Σ(ENV-str) + Σ(COM-str) + Σ(HUM-str) + 
Σ(EMP-str) + Σ(DIV-str) + Σ(PRO-str) + Σ(CGOV-str). 
Strengths - Factor A factor score on the number of strengths is constructed as the product sum 
of factor loadings and the number of strengths. 
#Concerns The number of KLD concerns. The sum of all counts in concern indicators 
reported in KLD’s six sections: Environment, Community, Human Rights, 
Employee Relations, Diversity, Product, and Corporate Governance.  Thus, 
it is computed as ∑Concerns = Σ(ENV-con) + Σ(COM-con) + Σ(HUM-con) 
+ Σ(EMP-con) + Σ(DIV-con) + Σ(PRO-con) + Σ(CGOV-con). 
Concerns - Factor A factor score on the number of concerns is constructed as the product sum 
of factor loadings and the number of concers. 
#Total ΣStrengths – ΣConcerns (Mishra and Modi 2013). 





DPolitician Holding An indicator for a firm’s shares being held by one or more politicians. 
DPolitician Holding: 0 to 1 An indicator for DPolitician Holding being changed from 0 to 1. 
DPolitician Holding: 1 to 0 An indicator for DPolitician Holding being changed from 1 to 0.  
#Politicians Holding Shares The number of politicians holding a firm’s shares.  
$Politician-Held Shares The reported dollar value of the politicians’ total holdings of a firm-year. 
The PFD file reports either the range of assets invested in a security or the 
exact size of the investment. We use the exact investment size wherever is 
available or the mean of the minimum and the maximum of the range. 
%Politician-Held 
Shares/MVE 
$Politician-Held Shares divided by the market value of equity (MVE) at the 




MtB Market-to-Book ratio, computed as market value of equity divided by book 
value of equity as of a fiscal year-end. 
Leverage Leverage ratio, computed as total debt divided by total assets. 
Ln(Sale) Natural log of net sales.  
R&D Expenses R&D Expenses in million USD. 
Return Volatility Stock return volatility for one year ending at a fiscal year-end. 
Annual Return Stock return for one year ending at a fiscal year-end. 
Sales Growth Sales growth, computed as net sales at year t divided by net sales at year t-1. 
#Business Segments The number of business segments. 
#Geographical Segments The number of geographical segments. 
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#Operating Segments The number of operating segments. 
Firm Age A firm’s age, computed as the number of years since its initial public 
offering. 
HHI A Herfindahl index for a three-digit SIC. 
High Litigation Industries An indicator for a firm’s primary industry belonging to high litigation 
industries: SICs of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 
7370–7374. 
New Economy Firms An indicator for a firm’s primary industry belonging to new economy 
industries: SICs of 3570–3572, 3576–3577, 3661, 3674, 4812– 4813, 5045, 
5961, 7370–7373. 
Loss An indicator for a net loss. 
S&P500 An indicator for a firm’s belonging to S&P 500. 
 
 
